Gayatri Balasamy v. ISG Novasoft: A New Chapter in Arbitration Law

Introduction On April 30, 2025, a five-judge bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India passed a judgement that is bound to have a far-reaching effect on the practice of arbitration. The issue before the court was one that has haunted discourse surrounding arbitration since its very birth: the extent to which the courts may interfere in the arbitration proceedings and the results thereof without compromising the same intention of having a non-adjudicatory conflict resolution mechanism. The five-judge bench comprising CJI Sanjiv Khanna, B.R. Gavai J, P.V. Sanjay Kumar J, K.V. Viswanathan J, A.G. Masih J; with a 4:1 majority, held that the courts do have a limited power to modify an arbitral award under § 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. In February 2024, a three-judge bench of the Supreme Court referred the Special Leave Petition arising out of Gayatri Balasamy v ISG Novasoft Technologies Limited[1] to a larger bench. The five questions referred to the larger bench by the three-judge bench included whether or not the courts have the power to modify an arbitral award, whether severability is an essential factor in determining if the award may be modified, the extent to which an award may be modified, can the power to modify be read into the power to set aside as per § 34 and finally, whether the decision of the court in the case of Project Director NHAI  v. M. Hakeem[2] laid down the correct law in deciding that the courts have no power whatsoever to modify an arbitral award.  The decision in Gayatri Balasamy[3] essentially sets forth the exceptions to the rule in M. Hakeem. Interpreting Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 The interpretation of the Act by the court in this judgement is interesting. The court offers a detailed discussion on the concept of “severability of awards” as stipulated in the proviso of § 34 (2)(a)(iv). The proviso, as per the Court, serves the dual purpose of establishing the Kompetenz-Kompetenz principle as enshrined in § 16 of the Act while also enabling the court to “sever” the parts of the award consisting of matters submitted for arbitration (valid) from that consisting of matters not submitted for arbitration (invalid)[4]. In this sense, the court considers the proviso to be clarificatory in nature[5]. The court then cited the doctrine of omne majus continet in se minus (the greater power includes the lesser) thus concluding that the power to set aside the award as a whole encompasses the power to set it aside in part[6]. In its analysis regarding the difference between the court’s power to “set aside” and the court’s power to “modify” the court emphasized that the legislation must be interpreted “contextually, taking into account the purpose, scope, and background of the provision”. While the terms “modification” and “setting aside” have different meanings, a holistic and purposive interpretation of these words would be consistent with the intent behind the provision and the act as a whole[7]. It was noted that partially setting aside an award is in effect, modifying it. It follows then, the court concluded, that the limited power to modify an award can be located in § 34 of the Act. It was further clarified that such an interpretation of the provision is consistent with the New York Convention and does not violate the doctrine of merger. The core principium of ADR The court emphasized that the main purpose of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), is to provide a quicker and more cost-effective alternative to courtroom litigation. The role of the domestic courts in the supportive capacity of a facilitator in expediting the resolution of disputes is vital[8]. In order to drive this point home, the court made the following statement: “To deny courts the authority to modify an award—particularly when such a denial would impose significant hardships, escalate costs, and lead to unnecessary delays—would defeat the raison d’être of arbitration.”[9] It was also highlighted that in the circumstances of the present case, a decision denying the Court’s power to modify the award would compel the parties to undergo another round of arbitration. This would result in unnecessary hardship for the parties thus defeating the very purpose envisioned in the process of arbitration. The Supreme Court’s power to do “Complete Justice” The applicability of the Supreme Court’s power to do complete justice under Article 142 of the Constitution was also discussed. The Court emphasized that this power must be exercised with great care and caution and cannot be in suppression or derogation of the objective and principle behind the A & C Act, 1996. Therefore, this power cannot be used to modify an arbitral award on merits. However, it may be exercised in cases where it is necessary to bring the litigation to an end in order to save the involved parties from unnecessary hardship. Concerns and criticism The judgement has caused a considerable amount of discomfort among the experts as many consider it to be in contravention of the objective of arbitration as a process by allowing for increased judicial intervention. In his dissenting opinion, Justice K V Vishwanathan described the idea of the words “or modified” being read into § 34 as “virtual mutilation of the fabric”[10] of the legislation. While the majority ruling emphasizes the ‘limited’ nature of this power of modification, concerns are being raised about the lack of clear and precise limitations. Conclusion While the decision to read a limited power to modify the A & C Act, 1996 may result in saving the concerned parties significant hardship, it cannot be denied that the lack of clear guidelines regarding the extent of the power would have serious repercussions. Many apprehend that it may create a fresh wave of litigation over what exactly constitutes a “limited” modification. Senior Counsel Arvind Datar, one of the counsels arguing in favor of modification, notes that a better recourse would be amending the provision to include the power “to vary” as is the case in Singapore Arbitration Act[11]. [1] 2024 SCC OnLine